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ABSTRACT  7 
EcologǇ ?ƐƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƐĂŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐƐĐŝĞŶĐĞis partly due to widespread misconceptions of its 8 
nature as well as shortcomings in its methodology. This paper argues that the pursuit of 9 
empirical laws of ecology can foster the emergence of a more unified and predictive science 10 
based on complementary modes of explanation. Numerical analyses of population dynamics 11 
have a distinguished pedigree, spatial analyses generate predictive laws of macroecology 12 
and physical analyses are typically pursued by the ecosystem paradigm. The most 13 
characteristically ecological laws, however, are found in biotic analyses in the functional 14 
trait paradigm. Holistic credentials for ecology may thus be restored on two bases: its 15 
accommodating complementary modes of analysis and explanation, and its having some 16 
laws within the least reductionistic mode consistent with its subject matter. These claims, 17 
grounded in the aspectual theory of Herman Dooyeweerd, lead to some suggestions for 18 
enhancing the versatility and usefulness of ecology  ? and other sciences  ? by balancing 19 
different research paradigms under a holistic vision. 20 
 21 
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 25 
Ecology, as the study of general patterns in the relationship of organisms to their 26 
environments, appears to be a holistic science. This notion is no doubt bolstered by its links 27 
to an ideology. What English-speakers call green is rendered in many other languages as 28 
ecological, which (also in English) evokes the ethic of conservation and certain kinds of 29 
nature-focused worldviews and lifestyles that reject reductionistic explanations and 30 
technologies. But all kinds of scientific analysis proceed by reducing the full richness of 31 
reality as we experience it to simpler quantitative concepts, and corresponding data in 32 
which patterns may be discerned and explained. So in what ways might ecology as a science 33 
really be more holistic  ? or less reductionistic  ? than, say, physics? This paper begins from an 34 
interpretation of both physics and ecology as comprising various kinds of models based on 35 
entities and quantities abstracted from the world of human experience  ? including a special 36 
class of model known as scientific laws that describe measurable relationships among 37 
variables and can be used to make predictions. In view of the complexity and 38 
interconnectedness of living systems, some might then imagine ƚŚĂƚĞĐŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐƐƵďũĞĐƚ39 
matter prevents it from being as successful in this enterprise as the physical sciences, 40 
drawing attention to how few its laws are and how limited in scope and accuracy. Others, 41 
taking the view that laws of physics actually control the Universe, imagine that ĞĐŽůŽŐǇ ?Ɛ42 
laws could only be curious instantiations of these real causal laws of nature: useful 43 
approximations to unpalatable equations, perhaps, that may be convenient for certain 44 
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applications. We dispute all this. The view advanced below recognizes a range of 45 
complementary types of abstraction across the sciences and appreciates a wide diversity of 46 
valid modes of scientific analysis and explanation, while denying that scientific laws 47 
constitute causal explanations. This leads to a new view of how to assess the holism of 48 
ecology and other sciences, regardless of their subject matter or ideological associations. 49 
Law is a contested term with many connotations. The root meaning is probably a decree 50 
by which a governor regulates the way people go about their lives. When laws of nature 51 
were conceived by early European natural philosophers such as Descartes and Boyle, the 52 
concept inherited much from the prominence of law in the Hebrew scriptures, where God is 53 
described as both making (e.g. Psalm 104, ESV) and respecting (e.g. Jeremiah 33:20, ESV) 54 
laws for the whole created order: inanimate, animate and human. With the advent of 55 
secularisation, the apparently inviolable nature of the laws for inanimate beings such as 56 
rocks and heavenly bodies (miracles aside) led some philosophers to the vision of 57 
discovering a set of true laws that would be equivalent to causes. However, that view largely 58 
gives way to a descriptive concept of scientific laws: the one often attributed to Isaac 59 
Newton. EĞǁƚŽŶ ?Ɛmathematical descriptions of relationships among abstract quantities 60 
such as mass, force and velocity helped establish an empirical tradition of laws of physics 61 
that need not be taken as causal explanations. Such laws were hypothesized, inferred (not 62 
deduced) and provisional. This is the basic sense in which we will use law (some readers 63 
might prefer regularity), and in the next section below we begin sketching a framework for 64 
some different classes of law, with examples from physics. Since ecology is very different 65 
from physics, the section then gives some introduction to ecology and why its laws might 66 
look different. 67 
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The central section of this paper then builds our framework more explicitly by exploring 68 
candidate ecological laws under four modes of analysis, according to the types of quantities 69 
they relate. Then in the following section a formal view of abstraction is laid out, drawing 70 
upon the framework of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd. Distinguishing 71 
abstraction from reductionism suggests new perspectives on the types of laws that may 72 
most fruitfully be sought in ecology. This leads on, in the final section, to some suggestions 73 
for the development of a truly holistic ecology.  74 
 75 
LAWS VIA ABSTRACTION IN PHYSICS AND ECOLOGY 76 
We begin by laying out a view of the relationships between laws and several other 77 
categories of model (Fig. 1). Scientific laws are often expressed as equations and so may be 78 
seen as a simple kind of mathematical model. They are often devised under the influence of 79 
conceptual models  ? such as the wave model of light, the organismic model of the plant 80 
community or the model of mutation and selection to explain evolution. We will return to 81 
conceptual models later, along with the notion of causal laws of nature. Mathematical 82 
models, meanwhile, may be classified into analytical and simulation models, each of which 83 
occupies a significant area of ecological research. Inferences may be deduced analytically or 84 
inferred from iterative simulations, by putting assumptions into mathematical forms and 85 
combining them. Dependence on multiple assumptions (Hall 1988), however, generally 86 
prevents such inferences from being taken as laws  ? rather as we distinguish ,ƵďďůĞ ?ƐLaw 87 
(based on observations) concerning the relative speeds of distant galaxies  from George 88 
>ĞŵĂŠƚƌĞ ?ƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵĐŚĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ (analytically modeled) on the basis of the 89 
theory of General Relativity and a model of cosmic inflation (Livio 2011). The challenge in 90 
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demonstrating the scientific relevance of any kind of model lies in satisfying a scientific 91 
community that its assumptions are met in some situation of theoretical interest, and for a 92 
candidate law, this may generally be done by demonstrating that the relation holds for sets 93 
of empirical observations drawn from a sufficiently wide range of situations. The difficulty of 94 
achieving this in a world of complex interactions may explain why so much ecological work 95 
has been devoted instead to other kinds of modelling. In this paper, nevertheless, we focus 96 
on descriptive laws as one of the scientific elements that is easier to define and recognize. 97 
 98 
[Figure 1 about here] 99 
 100 
A perspective on the development of physics out of natural philosophy, with the 101 
accompanying accumulation of proposed laws, will provide both background and contrast 102 
for our proposal for ecology. Danie Strauss (2010) provides an illuminating account of 103 
physics by focusing on levels of abstraction. The abstraction of numbers and numerical 104 
relations in the foundation of classical mathematics is an enduring legacy of ancient 105 
philosophy and arguably the ground of much subsequent success in the empirical sciences. 106 
Where observation-based theorizing was pursued, however, inadequacies of this rational 107 
mode of explanation gave place to a spatial mode involving irrational numbers and 108 
geometric relations  ? as employed in classical astronomy, for example. That the laws of 109 
geometry are not now considered part of physics perhaps underscores the foundational 110 
significance of the novel modes of explanation that followed. Indeed, in ŵƵĐŚŽĨĞƐĐĂƌƚĞƐ ?111 
natural philosophy the spatial mode remains predominant, and it is notable that the 112 
abstraction of space-filling corpuscles serves as a model of the Universe. But Descartes also 113 
6 
 
draws upon a clear concept of motion, and especially with the work of Galileo and Newton, 114 
a kinetic mode of explanation emerges as dynamic relations become a fundamental 115 
phenomenon, and laws were formulated describing trajectories, velocities and 116 
accelerations. Then, under the paradigm of thermodynamics, laws were formulated to 117 
describe the irreversible flows of heat and its interconversion with work, and energy came 118 
to be abstracted as a very general property of fluids and other bodies. Next, with quantum 119 
mechanics, electromagnetic radiation and subatomic particles come to be abstracted along 120 
with properties such as wavelength and spin, subject to laws of particle physics. Meanwhile 121 
Einstein ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ a mass ?energy equivalence and the concept of 122 
spacetime, accompanying the laws of relativity.  123 
In this view, physicists have always observed the behavior of non-living bodies, but 124 
abstraction at different levels has multiplied both the classes of entities and the number of 125 
quantities described by its expanding list of laws. TŽĚĂǇ ?ƐƉŚǇƐŝĐƐƐƚƵĚĞŶƚŵƵƐƚ ůĞĂƌŶ to 126 
abstract such entities as bodies, subatomic particles and waves, and such quantities as 127 
momentum, charge, spin and spacetime. And whatever may be said about progress across 128 
paradigms, the laws of physics do mostly remain useful. For example, engineers may still 129 
ŵĂŬĞǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚƵƐĞŽĨEĞǁƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ůĂǁƐŽĨŵŽƚŝŽŶ when dealing with discrete bodies, and of 130 
thermodynamic laws when dealing with fluids.  131 
A scientific law, then, describes a quantitative relationship among certain abstract 132 
quantities that apply to a corresponding class(es) of ideal entity and that hold under given 133 
conditions (or with provisos). It should reliably provide both explanations and predictions. 134 
For ecology to adopt this definition, however, some details and potential objections need to 135 
be addressed. We will do this by considering each element of our definition in turn  ? and we 136 
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hope, in the process, to absolve ourselves of the charge of physics envy sometimes leveled 137 
at approaches like ours.  138 
First, ƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐŽƌĞ ?quantitative relationships among abstract quantities. It 139 
must be noted that quantitative may cover statements of equality or directed inequality 140 
(greater/less than) among variables  ? as in the second law of thermodynamics. There are 141 
also what may be called meta-variables, which determine the meaning of other variables. 142 
Scale is perhaps the most important of these in ecology: the prevalence of heterogeneity 143 
and fluctuation means that quantities must usually be measured as an average over some 144 
region or time-period, and the value of the latter can greatly influence the measurement 145 
obtained. Accordingly, the set of candidate variables that may be combined in ecological 146 
laws is unlikely to be a limiting factor; conversely, the search for unifying theories looks 147 
tougher. 148 
Second, the classes of entity to which laws may pertain are if anything even more prolific 149 
in ecology, since biologists have expended considerable effort in classification projects. 150 
Species and organism are two particularly important general classes about which we will say 151 
more in the next section. Such classes may also be grouped in various hierarchies, from 152 
species up to kingdoms and from organisms up to ecosystems, items at various levels 153 
forming classes with their own properties. Moreover, ecologists may need to take into 154 
account the genetic diversity of individuals, seeing them as products of ontogenetic and 155 
phylogenetic histories. Mayr (1959) suggested that the uniqueness of ecology and evolution 156 
ůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ, ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂŵŽŶŐŝtems  ? 157 
whether species or organisms  ? more than similarities. This variability is another reason why 158 
the choice of appropriate scales is important. It also calls attention to the fact that laws 159 
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describe ideal entities. The entities described by laws of physics are such simple concepts as 160 
point charges, ideal gases and closed systems, which often appear good approximations to 161 
real things that physicists can observe; indeed electrons and other types of fundamental 162 
particles are observed so indirectly that they are simply assumed to be identical and ideal. 163 
But variation among individuals makes the subject-matter of biology difficult to idealize, and 164 
so less amenable to accurate description by laws. In summary, the multiplicity of ecological 165 
classes and the variability of entities within them calls for a very different approach from 166 
that of the physical sciences. Ecological laws may need to be less reductionistic in the sense 167 
of incorporating more information about individual differences. 168 
The final element of the definition to tackle is that of conditions and provisos. The 169 
celebrated universality of laws of physics is in fact qualified: while they may well be 170 
applicable in all parts of the Universe for all time, this comes at the expense of ceteris 171 
paribus assumptions that generally require conditions to be unrealistically monotonous (e.g. 172 
 ‘ŝĨ ŶŽŽƚŚĞƌĨŽƌĐĞƐĂĐƚ ?;  ‘ĂƚĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƚĞŵƉĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?)(Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003). But 173 
organisms evolve and function ecologically in intimate connection with particular 174 
environments, such that ceteris paribus ĐůĂƵƐĞƐ ? ‘ĂůůĞůƐĞďĞŝŶŐĞƋƵĂů ? ?ĐĂŶƐŝŵƉůǇŶĞǀĞƌďĞ175 
true: inumerable aspects of the environment may influence what is observed and their 176 
states cannot be fixed. We cannot, therefore, require that laws of ecology make very 177 
accurate predictions. Indeed, we may not even wish to imagine a biological experiment so 178 
well controlled that laws of biology would be accurate with good precision, for it might 179 
amount to killing the object of study, making biological laws irrelevant altogether. Cooper 180 
(2003, 113) suggested that an ecological law merely has to hold across a range of conditions 181 
large enough to be useful. Also, in view of ecology ?s focus on natural kinds (e.g. alleles, 182 
species and communities), we may allow some of its laws to apply only to certain classes of 183 
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entity. On the other hand, since natural kinds can be extremely diverse and are not held to 184 
be immutable, useful laws should apply to broad classes, such as the whole plant or animal 185 
kingdom on Earth, if not to all living things conceivable.  186 
Where provisos become prohibitively restrictive, an analytical shift is called for. One 187 
option is to look at different scales (Henle et al. 2014). Ecologists have always been 188 
constrained by logistical and computational limitations  ? but perhaps also beguiled by 189 
reductionist perspectives encouraging a focus on small areas and short time-horizons. Thus 190 
it took almost a century before individual behavior was properly considered in studies of 191 
animal demographics, with a corresponding increase in study scales (Levin et al. 1997). 192 
Similarly, early work on ecological communities focused on fine scales now enlarged in the 193 
light of understanding gained from studying landscape and even continental scales, along 194 
with global samples of species (Lessard et al. 2012). Making observations or analyses at a 195 
broader scale can, by the law of averages, reduce the unexplained variability (random noise) 196 
in quantitative relationships that are simultaneously influenced by many other factors . 197 
Ecological research is painstakingly slow, and decades may have been lost under research 198 
focused on scales too small for proper recognition of the forces at play. Accounting for 199 
larger time-scales takes even longer, and the value of long-term experiments has been 200 
appreciated more slowly, for obvious reasons. Nature works at great scales, and so must we.  201 
Increasing scales alone, however, does not necessarily bring success (Botkin 1977). The 202 
search for more general, resilient laws may be further aided by the use of different kinds of 203 
abstraction. Newtonian mechanics is not generally used to study the dynamics of fluids, nor 204 
electrostatic theory to explain chemical reactions. Such mismatches can occur in ecology, as 205 
we show in the next section.  206 
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 207 
CONTEMPORARY ECOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND THEIR LAWS 208 
Both practitioners (Lawton 1999; Murray 1992; Poulin 2007; Southwood 1980) and 209 
philosophers (Cooper 2003; Ulanowicz 2009) see a gulf between the reality of ecological 210 
science and the picture presented by 20th-century philosophers of science (often just 211 
philosophy of physics). They express varying degrees of unease at the fact that regularities 212 
in ecology seem hard to come by, and any laws acknowledged appear to be contingent, 213 
limited in explanatory power and unable to predict accurately. Sharing the unease, we 214 
believe the poverty of laws is partly for the reasons outlined in the previous section. We also 215 
agree with Lawton (1991) ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐĞĐŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌ216 
methodologies: arguably theoretical ecology has explored mathematical relations with 217 
limited opportunities to test their applicability to ecological systems, experimentation has 218 
been severely restricted in the spatial and temporal scales at which underlying processes  219 
are probed, and statistical ecology has been dominated by null-hypothesis tests designed to 220 
ask merely whether observed patterns are consistent with randomness or not. Some 221 
ecologists have launched profound critiques of the ways in which ecology is pursued as a 222 
science: both Peters (1991) and Murray (1992) complain of the failure to produce predictive 223 
laws. Perhaps our science is deemed holistic simply because it is messy! 224 
We believe there is more to ecology than has so far met the philosophĞƌ ?ƐĞǇĞ ?Just as a 225 
suite of alternative modes of analysis and explanation has unfolded historically in the 226 
physical sciences and remains useful for various applications, so it appears that a similar 227 
suite is displayed contemporaneously in the diverse practices and theories comprising the 228 
science of ecology. This may be illustrated by describing a set of four distinct ecological 229 
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modes of analysis that yield different types of laws and suggesting some of the outstanding 230 
candidates for laws of ecology that are proposed within each. We use the term paradigm 231 
here loosely and in the broad sense of a set of a set of examples, concepts and 232 
methodologies used by a community of researchers. We will say more about the 233 
corresponding modes of explanation later. 234 
 235 
The population paradigm 236 
Since early last century the population paradigm has built upon basic organismal biology  ? 237 
concerning ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ?ƉŚǇƐŝŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚůŝĨĞ-histories  ? with the study of population dynamics 238 
(Nicholson 1933). This paradigm primarily focuses on the abundances of single biological 239 
species, or pairwise interactions between species . The individual is a fundamental concept 240 
in biology, but it is nevertheless an abstract class of entity (Fig. 2). Recognizing individuals in 241 
practice is relatively straightforward in the case of most animals but often less so for plants, 242 
which may be clonal and spread vegetatively; a hint of reductionism may already be seen in 243 
abstracting individual grass plants from a meadow, for example. Then, given a method of 244 
enumerating individuals, population sizes can be abstracted by applying the biological 245 
species concept (Mayr 1942). This too may be fraught with conceptual challenges, but 246 
armed with a working definition and search-image of a species of interest, an experienced 247 
ecologist can assess the numbers of individuals within a specified region (classically 248 
populations are considered as closed to migration). Dividing such counts by the area or 249 
volume of the region then yields population densities, which are the focal quantity in 250 
population-ecology studies. Such densities may be compared over time or space and 251 
mathematically related to each other. 252 
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The main universal law proposed in this paradigm is that of density-dependence. This 253 
states that in any given system (specified location and species), there is a density known as 254 
the carrying capacity above which populations tend to decline and below which they tend to 255 
increase. The determinants of this density, the rate at which it is approached and the nature 256 
of fluctuations around it are modeled in terms of density-dependent dynamics (Hixon, 257 
Pacala, and Sandin 2002), with empirical data being used to estimate free parameters for 258 
each of these details. When there are one or more parameters that must be estimated from 259 
data in any given situation, we may speak of a weak law, since it can only be used for 260 
making predictions once the parameter(s) are believed to be correct. A class of laws in this 261 
paradigm pertains to the prediction of carrying capacities in particular kinds of system 262 
(Peters 1991, 275). Arguments have raged from the 1940s (Nicholson 1954) and 1960s (den 263 
Boer 1968) through to the 21st century (Berryman 2002) about the true nature and role of 264 
density-dependence in population ecology, but one of its defining assumptions is the ideal 265 
of the closed population.  266 
Other laws emerge from the idea of the metapopulation. Metapopulation models 267 
simulate how discrete patches of habitat alternate between being occupied and unoccupied 268 
by a species according to demographic stochasticity and migration rates between the 269 
patches (Harrison and Taylor 1997). It has been shown that long-term stability may pertain 270 
without assuming any form of density dependence: the mathematical definition of 271 
metapopulation capacity implies a law of persistence based on basic demographic 272 
properties (Hanski and Ovaskainen 2000). Such models are not explicitly spatial, although 273 
they are only realistic when assumed to describe population patches spread over much 274 
larger areas than those modeled using classical density-dependence. Indeed, ecology is 275 
replete with laws and phenomena that apply at particular ranges of scale (Levin 1992). 276 
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The population paradigm can extend to a multi-species analogy. Scaling up from 277 
populations of individuals to populations of species, neutral community models consider 278 
speciation and extinction in place of birth and death. Neutral here means that species are 279 
considered as equivalent to each other ? ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂƌĞ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ-blind, ?ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚ280 
other and their environment in the same way regardless of what species they belong to. An 281 
observer can distinguish them, and they reproduce after their own kind, but in simple 282 
neutral models there are no specific habitat preferences or competitive interactions . The 283 
unified neutral theory of biodiversity and biogeography (Hubbell 2001) explores the 284 
statistical implications of assuming functional equivalence of all species in a community, 285 
giving predictions of relative abundance distributions for large numbers of anonymous 286 
species and their expected lifetimes.  287 
The population paradigm, in summary, considers abundances in fixed spatial regions, so 288 
that it can be seen as primarily numerical. A classic statement of this paradigm is John 289 
,ĂƌƉĞƌ ?Ɛ address to the British Ecological Society (1967):  ‘A Darwinian Approach to Plant 290 
Ecology. ? 291 
 292 
[Figure 2 about here] 293 
 294 
The macroecology paradigm 295 
What we call the macroecology paradigm is fundamentally geometrical. With roots going 296 
back nearly two centuries (Watson 1847), analyses of spatial patterns have gathered 297 
momentum in recent decades with advances in probability theory and computational 298 
possibilities (Smith et al. 2008). This paradigm typically focuses on the patterns of multiple 299 
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species across large extents of space and sometimes time (Fig. 2). Important laws of the 300 
spatial-ecological paradigm relate numbers of individuals, of species and of endemic species 301 
to variable areas of observation  ? which may be isolated, contiguous or nested (Scheiner 302 
2003). The theory of island biogeography (MacArthur and Wilson 1967), seminal in this 303 
paradigm, was largely heuristic: when the area of islands and the corresponding numbers of 304 
species found on them are both log-transformed, data points tended to cluster around a 305 
straight line. It has since been shown how species ?area relationships for islands of varying 306 
area can be derived mathematically by combining the principles of random, distance-307 
dependent migration of individuals with demographic stochasticity (Hanski and Gyllenberg 308 
1997), and how a range of relationships among numbers of species and areas in contiguous 309 
space arise from principles of local dispersal of distinct species (Chave and Leigh 2002).  310 
The macroecology paradigm has been highly successful in generating laws relating its 311 
own fundamental quantities to each other. While the laws are typically weak, having at least 312 
one free parameter to be tuned to fit empirical data, typical ranges of some parameters 313 
have been characterized, increasing the scope for making predictions. For example, species ?314 
area relationships typically follow a power-law with exponent between 0.15 and 0.4, for 315 
plants as well as animals  ? the lower end of this range being typical for islands, smaller 316 
organisms and higher latitudes (Drakare, Lennon, and Hillebrand 2006). A contemporary 317 
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŵĂǇďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĐĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƵŶŝĨŝĞĚƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ318 
biodiversity (McGill 2010). Here Brian McGill focuses on mathematically unifying six theories 319 
ƚŚĂƚĞĂĐŚ ‘ƵŶŝĨǇŝĚĞĂƐŽĨĂƌĞĂ ?ĂďƵŶĚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ?ƌŝĐŚŶĞƐƐ. ?But because the latter is 320 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ďŝŽĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ, ?ƚŚĞƉĂƉĞƌŵight be naïvely taken to present the 321 
unified theory of ecology! 322 
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Despite its name and fanfare, we might after all question how far the macroecology 323 
paradigm is intrinsically ecological. Its focus on spatial and numerical abstraction (Caswell 324 
1976) is such that its laws are not necessarily specific to living organisms: they might equally 325 
well describe spatial patterns of types of non-living artefacts, or in human cultural systems 326 
(e.g. Bentley, Hahn, and Shennan 2004)  ? and indeed a proportion of its significant papers 327 
are published in physics journals (e.g. Blythe and McKane 2007). While proponents of the 328 
paradigm may see this as a mark of success, this must be tempered by the limited kinds of 329 
quantities that can be predicted  ? which are mostly numerical and spatial. A similar charge 330 
may be laid to the population paradigm: its predictive quantities are essentially counts of 331 
things (individuals, species or occupied patches), and some of its laws might conceivably 332 
apply to non-biotic entities such as molecules in chemical reactions (e.g. Sadownik et al. 333 
2016). 334 
Thus the contrast between the population and macroecology paradigms should not be 335 
overplayed. They have in common a focus on the individual and its species identification, 336 
and many studies span both paradigms, as exemplified by the literature on spatial density-337 
dependence (e.g. Gunton and Pöyry 2016) and spatial neutral models (Rosindell and Cornell 338 
2007). We now turn to a pair of paradigms in which the species concept serves as no more 339 
than a tool. 340 
 341 
The ecosystemic paradigm 342 
The ecosystemic paradigm originates with the project by Tansley (1935) to use concepts 343 
from physics to understand ecological processes. As such, it defines the ecosystem to 344 
include non-living features along with the biotic. This abiotic environment is, of course, 345 
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biotically referenced; it concerns those physical features that are known (or hypothesized) 346 
to affect living organisms, such as temperature, light and chemicals with which living tissues 347 
may interact. This paradigm can also absorb the ambiguity over whether morbose or 348 
detached tissues are living or not (Lindeman 1942). Integrating living and non-living 349 
elements for scientific analysis entails a focus on the highest common mode of functioning 350 
shared by these elements, which is physical. Thus quantities  routinely abstracted in the 351 
ecosystemic paradigm include biomass, carbon pools, chemical concentrations, energy flux 352 
rates, evaporation rates and temperature. Such quantities are attributed to ecosystems and 353 
specified compartments within them, although in practice this is often done by drawing 354 
upon data attributed to individual organisms and species. The aim is to abstract to a level 355 
beyond the complexities of interactions between specific individuals in order to assess 356 
emergent behaviors and attributes. These typically include such complex concepts as net 357 
primary productivity, evapotranspiration, rates of nutrient cycling and food-web complexity.  358 
Candidate laws connecting ecosystem variables are not difficult to find insofar as 359 
empirical relationships are regularly quantified in ecosystem studies. Their predictive power 360 
is rarely impressive, however (Reichstein et al. 2014). The ecosystemic paradigm presents 361 
challenges for ecologists in search of laws more than any other paradigm: its variables are 362 
difficult to measure and highly sensitive to scale, its entities are difficult to observe and 363 
define, and the conditions that might need to be specified as provisos can rarely be 364 
controlled or found in steady states. Weak laws have, nevertheless, been formulated 365 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐĞĐŽƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ĚŝƐƚƵƌďĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ366 
variables to soil nutrient concentrations and rainfall. Examples include resource response 367 
models such as the equations relating overall chlorophyll concentration, plankton biomass 368 
or primary productivity to the total phosphorus concentration of a lake (Table 10.1 in Peters 369 
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1991), the intermediate disturbance hypothesis, which states that the species richness of a 370 
site will be maximized at intermediate intensities of disturbance (Wilkinson 1999), and the 371 
productivity ?fire relationship, stating that fire intensities are greatest at intermediate levels 372 
of habitat productivity (Reich et al. 2001). Such laws have mostly been arrived at 373 
heuristically, through empirical observation of variables of interest at a range of spatial and 374 
temporal scales, followed by statistical parameterisation.  375 
This paradigm offers great scope for selecting appropriate scales and levels of 376 
abstraction, and perhaps the best statement of its potential is made by Robert Ulanowicz 377 
(2009). 378 
 379 
The trait paradigm 380 
The paradigm of trait-based ecology has risen to prominence in the last few decades  but sits 381 
in historic continuity with the wider science of biology. This paradigm concerns the 382 
abstraction of functional traits (Fig. 2): properties that may be measured across a wide 383 
taxonomic range of individuals, that may be standardized to some degree and that are 384 
hypothesized to relate to the survival and reproduction of the organism (McGill et al. 2006). 385 
They typically include standardized measurements of specified organs and their chemical 386 
composition. While such quantities may also feature in other paradigms, the trait-ecology 387 
paradigm is distinguished by its search for general principles or rules applying across many 388 
species (McGill et al. 2006). For example, comparisons of ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ?ƚƌĂŝƚ attributes (specific 389 
values of traits) were central to the development of niche theory. The competitive exclusion 390 
principle (Gause 1934) suggested that only one species could occupy a given niche, leading 391 
to the hypothesis of some degree of limiting similarity in the attributes of pairs of species 392 
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that could coexist (den Boer 1986). There were attempts to quantify this limiting similarity 393 
(Rappoldt and Hogeweg 1980), but attempts to find a general law largely failed (Wilson, 394 
Gitay, and Agnew 1987). 395 
More successfully, various schemes have been proposed for relating the relative values 396 
of suites of functional traits to each other across different species and habitats. The idea of 397 
arranging species along a spectrum according to their tolerance of disturbance (MacArthur 398 
and Wilson 1967) was combined with the concept of adversity selection (Whittaker 1975) by 399 
Southwood (1977), who proposed a habitat-based  ‘templatĞ ? for ecological communities 400 
defined by two fundamental axes: the predictability and the favorability of habitats 401 
(Greenslade 1983). The C-S-R theory of primary strategy types for plants (Grime 1974), and 402 
more ambitiously for living organisms in general (Grime and Pierce 2012), takes a similar 403 
approach but proposes three fundamental axes. Habitats conducive to vigorous competition 404 
are expected to exclude stress-adapted and short-lived species, while stressful and 405 
disturbed habitats support only stress-tolerant and ruderal species respectively. Here we 406 
notice the use of trait attributes to abstract functional types: analogues of biological species. 407 
An important step towards operationalizing the C-S-R theory was provided by the discovery 408 
of the leaf economics spectrum (Wright et al. 2004), which appears to describe 'ƌŝŵĞ ?Ɛ 409 
competitor ?stress-tolerator axis for plants in terms of correlations among six leaf traits. 410 
Since the analysis by Wright et al. (2004) was based on a global dataset of higher plants 411 
from a wide range of habitat types, quantitative relationships it described may meet the 412 
requirement for universality of laws. Let us consider the relationship with the greatest 413 
degree of correlation as a test case. This relates logarithms (in base 10) of nitrogen to 414 
phosphorus concentrations in leaves (respectively N and P, both in %) as: log N = 0.83 + 0.66 415 
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log P  ? i.e. a 4.6-fold change in nitrogen concentration per 10-fold increase in phosphorus, 416 
with covariance of 0.72. This indicates a non-linear relationship: the ratio of nitrogen to 417 
phosphorus concentrations increases with increasing nitrogen concentration. Earlier work 418 
had suggested that the ratio was typically around 10 (Garten 1976) and recognized effects 419 
of nutrient limitation, but that law can now be replaced by this more comprehensive one. 420 
Analogous laws have been proposed for various wood traits of woody plants (Chave et al. 421 
2009), and there has been discussion of a more general  ‘ƉůĂŶƚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ?422 
(Freschet et al. 2010).  423 
It is true that this statistical ?empirical approach could be pursued to the point where a 424 
 ‘law ? is discovered every time a statistical model is fitted to data from a broad enough data 425 
set (Peters 1991), and some rates of decline in accuracy with increasing scope may be too 426 
precipitous to be acceptable. The following is an example of a more theory-driven case  ? 427 
which also brings the possibility of pre-specifying the kinds of conditions in which a law 428 
should most clearly be observed. The fact that metabolic rates tend to scale as a function of 429 
body-size raised to the power of about three-quarters (B3/4), for of all kinds of organisms, 430 
had been known for a long time without a satisfying explanation (Feldman and McMahon 431 
1983) until West, Brown, and Enquist (1997) published a metabolic scaling theory that 432 
explains this relationship in terms of the physics of fluid flow. Indeed, their theory also 433 
predicts observed body-size dependencies for rates of cellular metabolism, heartbeat and 434 
maximal population growth (all B-1/4), and time periods of blood circulation, embryonic 435 
growth and life-span (all B1/4) (West, Brown, and Enquist 1997). Various other physiological 436 
laws might also be cited here (Peters 1991, 281).  437 
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As mentioned earlier, openness of paradigm boundaries means that some successful 438 
work straddles more than one paradigm. Laws for body-size ?abundance distributions in 439 
animals (referenced in Peters and Raelson 1984), for example, combine a trait with a spatial 440 
quantity to achieve moderate predictive power with broad applicability. The trait paradigm, 441 
however, is particularly characteristic of ecology, and we suggest that its development will 442 
be crucial to the future of the science  ? not to mention its public appeal. There are many 443 
contemporary statements of its scope (Verberk, van Noordwijk, and Hildrew 2013; 444 
Winemiller et al. 2015). 445 
 446 
 447 
MODES OF ANALYSIS AND ASPECTS OF REALITY 448 
Our brief survey of four ecological paradigms (summarized in Table 1) reveals some 449 
fundamentally different concepts among them. It also suggests that while laws have been 450 
proposed mostly in the population and macroecology paradigms, which are mathematically-451 
oriented, there is great scope for general laws to be specified in the more ecologically 452 
oriented trait and ecosystemic paradigms. A quantitative study along these lines has in fact 453 
recently appeared: Linquist et al. (2016) analyzĞĚƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚ454 
generalizĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶĞĐŽůŽŐǇďǇĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŵĞƚĂ-analyses concerning the three 455 
areas of population, community and ecosystem studies. Statistically-significant effects were 456 
registered in around 80% of the 187 meta-analyses used, and the finding that average 457 
sample sizes, numbers of taxa and numbers of biomes were broadly similar was taken to 458 
indicate comparable levels of generality for candidate laws in the three areas of ecology. 459 
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Comparing actual degrees of scope and predictive accuracy among our different paradigms 460 
would be an illuminating exercise. 461 
 462 
 [Table 1 about here] 463 
 464 
It may be asked why the four paradigms we have identified should be so significant. An 465 
answer may be given after synthesizing a number of proposals made so far. We have 466 
suggested that scientific analyses depend upon abstracting classes of entities and 467 
quantitative properties from real-world situations observed by scientists. We have affirmed 468 
the descriptive definition of scientific laws as resilient relationships among such quantities 469 
when predicated of ideal entities  ? whether they describe the numbers of fundamental 470 
particles in atoms or the density of individuals in types of habitat, the locations of planets or 471 
living organisms in 2- or 3- dimensional space, or the energy of fluids in containers or energy 472 
flow rates in ecosystems. Finally, we have suggested some distinct modes of analysis as a 473 
basis for distinguishing scientific paradigms. Our synthesis of these proposals draws upon 474 
the framework of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd, who suggested building a 475 
systematic understanding of reality upon the recognition of multiple fundamental nuclei for 476 
the human faculty of abstraction (Dooyeweerd 1953). ŽŽǇĞǁĞĞƌĚ ?Ɛ ůŝƐƚ of these nuclei 477 
began with the categories numerical, geometric, kinetic, physical, biotic and sensitive. For 478 
example, gathering data on tree seedlings in a forest, one might abstract the concepts of 479 
number in counting individuals, of height and location in measuring them, and of disease 480 
and death in examining their tissues. Asked what kind of variables were collected, we might 481 
summarize these respectively as numerical, spatial and biotic variables concerning the 482 
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seedlings. This summary abstracts three broader categories, of the kind that Dooyeweerd 483 
ƚĞƌŵĞĚ  ‘ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ŽĨƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ? 484 
According to Dooyeweerd, one cannot meaningfully abstract further to unify, say, the 485 
numerical and spatial aspects, the spatial and biotic, or all three. The intrinsically biotic 486 
properties of a situation cannot be explained by spatial properties, for example, or vice-487 
versa. Attempting to substitute any of these aspects for any other without loss of meaning is 488 
reductionistic in a way that Dooyeweerd showed to be experientially incoherent; such 489 
attempts deprive the concepts of their intuitive meanings (Dooyeweerd 1953). The 490 
existence of distinct kinds of laws for spatial, physical and biotic properties may also be 491 
suggested by the distinct natures of biology, physics and geometry; while each discipline in 492 
this list depends upon concepts drawn from the following ones, the converse is not true; 493 
moreover, these sciences tend to remain separate in the structures of academic institutions . 494 
The distinction of the aspects has been argued elsewhere (Strauss 2009); for present 495 
purposes we simply draw upon them heuristically. While debate over the legitimacy of 496 
various kinds of reductionism will continue, we may fruitfully continue exploring the 497 
diversity of modes of analysis across the science of ecology under the suspicion that they 498 
reflect distinct aspects of reality. 499 
The mutual irreducibility of a set of modes of analysis suggests an explanation for the 500 
coexistence of such contrasting paradigms as we find in contemporary ecology. While the 501 
population-ecology paradigm assumes certain intrinsically-biotic concepts such as 502 
reproduction, maturity, death and competition, these are simply reduced to multiplicative 503 
coefficients in most work so that the main focus can be numerical . Accordingly, its laws and 504 
other outputs generally concern population sizes, structures and extinctions  ? outputs 505 
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useful enough for purposes of population management, such as species conservation. 506 
Similarly, the macroecological paradigm is focused on spatial as well as numerical 507 
properties. Accordingly, geometrical patterns are what its laws can predict  ? and useful for 508 
biodiversity management. Indeed, this paradigm also seems to cover the temporal 509 
biodiversity patterns studied in paleoecology. The ecosystemic paradigm again involves 510 
biotic abstraction, but its focus is those physical quantities that can also capture dead and 511 
non-living components of a system. Its special concern with processes may also reveal a 512 
kinetic mode of analysis concerning fluxes, states and changes, which concepts Dooyeweerd 513 
attributed to ĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ ‘ŬŝŶĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞŽƵƚƉƵƚƐŽĨƚŚe ecosystemic 514 
paradigm can be useful for management of land and water bodies as well as the increasing 515 
challenge to manage global climate. The trait paradigm, finally, is directly focused on biotic 516 
phenomena. It seeks laws to describe biotic functions occurring within and between 517 
organisms, and its outputs should be useful for such diverse interests as the improvement of 518 
ĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐƵůƚŝǀĂƌƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŝŶǀĂƐŝǀĞƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌĂŶĚbiological impacts of 519 
extinctions. Like the other paradigms, it has its blind-spots and may be combined with 520 
different paradigms for certain purposes. In summary, each paradigm answers certain kinds 521 
of questions and has different contributions to make in the application of ecological science 522 
to the challenges identified by society. 523 
The postulate of distinct kinds of abstraction may also suggest an evaluation of the 524 
history of particular sciences and hypotheses for future work.The account of physics with 525 
which we started portrays ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŽŶŐŽŽǇĞǁĞĞƌĚ ?ƐƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨŵŽĚĞƐŽĨ526 
abstraction, and leaves open the possibility that there might even be further aspects of 527 
reality to disclose in the study of non-living things (the framework was expected to be 528 
developed and refined: Dooyeweerd 1953, vii)  ? a question that we must leave to 529 
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philosophers more active within that field. The ecological story is not so evidently 530 
progressive; indeed its notable abandoned paradigm  ? the organismic model of 531 
communities  ? is decidedly biotic in emphasis (Clements 1916, cited in Keller and Golley 532 
2000), and it seems unlikely that the population, macroecology and ecosystemic paradigms 533 
will come to be seen as precursors to the functional trait paradigm. Instead, one might see 534 
the coexistence of paradigms as a healthy part of such a holistic science. After all, it is clear 535 
that earlier paradigms of the physical sciences are by no means dead, and that many 536 
scientific laws have enduring validity. Ecology might be so much the richer for its privileged 537 
position, able to draw upon a range of modes of abstraction. ,ĞƌĞ ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŽŽǇĞǁĞĞƌĚ ?Ɛ538 
sequence on to the sensitive aspect, we should also mention the science of behavioral 539 
ecology as a paradigm partly focused on the sensitive perceptions of animals .  540 
To draw together the challenges of prediction and explanation, the meaning of 541 
reductionism should be clarified. Reduction is sometimes used to mean what should be 542 
called abstraction. Abstraction is surely an essential  ? even foundational  ? component of the 543 
sciences, whereas reductionism tends to imply a simplistic notion of causation (Levins and 544 
Lewontin 1980). Reductionism thus remains problematic for the reasons given above, as 545 
reflected in the term greedy reductionism (Dennett 1995), and we suggest that recognizing a 546 
legitimate plurality of modes of analysis in ecology should guard against this. But we can 547 
also take modes of analysis to provide modes of explanation, as suggested by Strauss (2009, 548 
402-416). A brief look at ecological modes of explanation will help conclude our survey. That 549 
is, how do scientific laws relate to conceptual models?  550 
Likening a complex situation to something more familiar is the basis of many a scientific 551 
explanation, as suggested by the predominance of metaphors in scientific terminology. 552 
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Ecology is replete with these: populations and their carrying capacities; communities, 553 
assemblages and systems; competition, stress and disturbance; and traits and their filters 554 
are just some prominent examples. The analogies behind these metaphors sometimes 555 
suggest causal analogues that may be influential in theorizing about a topic. Carrying 556 
capacities suggest volumes of containers that can hold certain numbers of items and spill if 557 
over-filled  ? and so the law of density-dependence may gain a mechanical connotation that 558 
seems, to most ecologists (let alone laypersons), to provide a more compelling causal 559 
analogue than any notion of causation acquired from watching the births, struggles and 560 
deaths of moths or fruit flies in jars of medium. Trait filters suggest a sieving process 561 
(sometimes directly illustrated  ? e.g. Keddy 1992) in which certain trait values are admitted 562 
to a collection while others are excluded  ? and so laws of community composition similarly 563 
gain a mechanical connotation that provides a compelling causal analogue. Indeed, most of 564 
the above metaphors concern mechanical analogies, which prompts the question whether 565 
ĞĐŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŵŽĚĞůƐĂƌĞƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚůǇ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ?ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶmay be the 566 
exception in the above list)  ? and if so, why. A detailed study of the diversity of conceptual 567 
models in ecology and their relationships to ecological laws would no doubt be illuminating. 568 
For now, we may surmise that the predominance of mechanical metaphors and imagery in 569 
conceptual models makes up for the relatively small contribution of the physical 570 
(ecosystemic) paradigm to ĞĐŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐůĂǁƐ ? Thus, as modes of explanation, the paradigms 571 
must complement to each other if one is not to displace the others. 572 
 573 
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A TRULY HOLISTIC ECOLOGY 574 
Contemporary ecological science employs a range of levels of abstraction  ? manifested in 575 
both its analytical laws and its conceptual models  ? and analyses phenomena at a range of 576 
scales. Our vision for ecology as a holistic science, then, may be grounded in three features. 577 
First, ecology gradually refines its focus to appropriately-broad spatial and temporal scales 578 
of analysis within each of its paradigms. This is perhaps comparable with the inclusion into 579 
physics of such concepts as action at a distance and statistical mechanics. Second, a portion 580 
of its theory (and laws) is based on abstractions that can only be made of living things. This 581 
means not only abstraction of biological classes (common to all  the paradigms), but also of 582 
essentially biological quantities such as demographic rates, speciation rates and trait values. 583 
More generally, we might say that ecology sometimes employs the least reductionistic 584 
mode of analysis consistent with its subject matter  ? and in this sense contemporary 585 
physics, with its understanding of energy, is also more holistic than Newtonian physics . 586 
Thirdly, it is significant that ecology accommodates a range of complementary modes of 587 
analysis, focusing on what may be conceived of as the numerical, spatial and physical 588 
aspects of reality as well as the biotic. It has been claimed that community ecology could be 589 
logically and mathematically reduced to population ecology, and that in turn to  ‘individual 590 
ecology ? (Schoener 1986), and this may be plausible within areas of those three programs 591 
concerned with abstraction at the  ‘ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?physical?) level; indeed the claim appears 592 
trivial if considered merely at the spatial level (since the macroecology paradigm can well 593 
work with neutral species). But a claim that the trait, ecosystemic, spatial and population 594 
paradigms might be mutually reducible cannot even be entertained, we suggest, without 595 
denying the fundamental concepts of organisms, flows, patterns and counts as we intuit 596 
them. These concepts are not differentiated simply by scaling, as sometimes claimed; they 597 
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are logically incommensurable (Clouser 2005, 192f). This ǀŝĞǁŽĨĞĐŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐŚŽůŝƐŵ may now 598 
suggest some ways in which the versatility and usefulness of the science may be enhanced 599 
by balancing different research paradigms under such a vision. 600 
Our view may be summarized by three distinctive proposals. Firstly, ecology can and 601 
should have its own laws, and these may be discovered quite heuristically. Quantitative 602 
relationships among variables abstracted at appropriate levels and measured at appropriate 603 
scales are legitimate candidates for laws of ecology, and the community will determine 604 
which ones are sufficiently robust to be accepted as such. Secondly, our four modes of 605 
ecology offer a robust alternative to the typical major divisions of ecology textbooks. 606 
Textbooks commonly distinguish population, community and ecosystem ecology, treating 607 
macroecology (if at all) with evolution and trait ecology rather haphazardly; one of the most 608 
popular textbooks reveals a particularly individual-focused emphasis in its tripartite division 609 
into  ‘Organisms, ?  ‘Species interactions ? and  ‘ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĐŽƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? (Begon, 610 
Townsend, and Harper 2006). Thirdly, our view supports broader philosophical challenges 611 
against both reductive physicalism and holistic vitalism. The notion of physical mechanisms 612 
being the ultimate model of causation leaves ecology as a peripheral and inescapably 613 
complicated science (Colyvan and Ginzburg 2003) where chance often has to be invoked as 614 
a pseudo-cause (Ulanowicz 2009). Vitalism (or idealist holism: Levins and Lewontin 1980), by 615 
contrast, tends to advance non-deterministic explanations  ? as in the organismic view of 616 
plant communities (Clements 1916, cited in Keller and Golley 2000). Our view, while 617 
agnostic about the locus of causation, expects  a wide range of ecological phenomena to be 618 
broadly predictable under suitable analyses. 619 
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We end, then, with a plea for pluralism. Ecologists should celebrate the diversity of 620 
paradigms that make up our science and recognize that progress in theoretical and applied 621 
ecology will be enhanced by the use of modes of analysis appropriate for the applications 622 
envisaged. In particular we suggest that there will be room for strong laws and unifying 623 
theories in each of the main paradigms of ecology. Educators, meanwhile, might emphasise 624 
to students the distinctly biotic paradigm of trait ecology, perhaps even as their primary 625 
introduction to the science before numerical, spatial and physical paradigms. Finally, we 626 
hope that philosophers of science will recognize the diverse set of modes through which a 627 
holistic notion of causation may be refracted to yield complementary causal accounts, none 628 
of which is ontologically privileged  ? although some will invariably be more useful than 629 
others in any given situation. Further work on concepts of causation in ecology is called for 630 
(Bateson and Laland 2013). 631 
If the proposal made here proves useful in the science of ecology, investigation along 632 
similar lines in the human sciences might uncover yet richer arrays of paradigms in holistic 633 
complementarity. In psychology, the longstanding opposition between unimodal and 634 
bimodal interpretations of the human mind might be overtaken by views recognizing the 635 
complementarity of three or more modes for conceptualising and analysing the phenomena 636 
of human experience. In the social sciences Dooyeweerd recognized the value of historic 637 
and linguistic aspects alongside a truly social one (Dooyeweerd 1953), and this scheme 638 
further recognizes distinct economic, aesthetic and juridical aspects as being invoked in 639 
appropriate fields of scholarship. 640 
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Table 1: Focal concepts and topics of the four ecological paradigms outlined in this article. 647 
Note that this set of paradigms is not intended to be exhaustive but simply to illustrate 648 
some alternative approaches to scientific abstraction in ecology. 649 
 Population Macroecology Ecosystemic Trait 
Approximate 
synonyms: 
Autecology; 
Species ecology 
Neutral/near-
neutral ecology 
Process ecology Comparative 
ecology; 
Synecology 
Focal 
abstractions: 
Population; 
Species 
Spatial pattern; 
Species 
Process; 
Community 
Functional trait; 
Individual 
Other 
fundam-
ental 
concepts: 
Life-cycle Habitat patch Resource fluxes Niche; 
Functional type 
Typical laws: Density-
dependence 
Species ?area 
relationships 
Productivity 
relationships 
Trait 
relationships 
Fundamental 
questions: 
Are population 
densities 
regulated? 
What is the 
unified theory 
of biodiversity? 
How do 
ecosystems 
interact with 
their 
environment? 
How do different 
species coexist? 
Are there real 
types of 
communities? 
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Typical 
application: 
Will this species 
survive in this 
region? 
How many 
species will be 
found in this 
region? 
How stable is 
this ecosystem? 
Which species 
will be found in 
this community? 
Aspect of 
analysis: 
Numerical Spatial Physical Biotic 
 650 
 651 
 652 
Figure 1. A conceptual map to situate scientific laws among a range of other concepts 653 
discussed in the text. These are ordered from the more specific (left) to the more general 654 
(right), and from the more complex (bottom) to the simpler (top). The contact and overlap 655 
among the ellipses are intended to suggest, respectively, degrees of conceptual proximity 656 
and semantic overlap. The italicized words in each ellipse comprise a set of examples taken 657 
from evolutionary ecology. 658 
 659 
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 660 
 661 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of modes of analysis employed in various ecological 662 
paradigms. The grey cloud represents the world of experience. The ellipses represent 663 
classes of entities abstracted from experience, while the boxes represent kinds of quantities 664 
abstracted, to which laws may apply. Arrows point from quantities or entities to others that 665 
they help to define. The four paradigms corresponding to the four focal quantities are given 666 
in upper-case letters adjacent to the relevant boxes. 667 
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